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Abstract
In the real world, two types of education investment may exist. One of these contributes
to labor skills, and the other does not, corresponding to human capital and signal invest-
ment, respectively. The question is how individuals determine the ratio of these alternative
investments. In response, we formulate an overlapping generations economy where the rich
and the poor invest in both types of education. We argue that the ratio of human capital to
signal investment is a U-shaped function of the wage dierentials between the rich and the
poor. Moreover, we identify three patterns of stable steady states for these wage dierentials,
namely, no-inequality, high-inequality, and multiple steady states. Using these results, we
conclude that exogenous factors, such as skill-biased technical change, may switch the steady
state from no-inequality to high-inequality, and as a result, the ratio of human capital to
signal investment changes in a U-shaped form during the transition to the new steady state.
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1 Introduction
In the real world, two types of education investment may exist: one that contributes to labor
skills, and one that does not. We interpret the former as human capital investment, whereas
the latter, at least in the present analysis, is related to (but slightly distinct from) the concept
of signaling theory in Spence (1973). Subsequently applied in a variety of models, especially
in higher education, signaling theory has found widespread acceptance in actuality. However,
it constitutes a serious problem if students invest too much in signaling, mainly because it
does not contribute to human capital accumulation. For policy purposes, it is then worth
analyzing how private investment in higher education can promote human capital, while at
the same time bearing in mind the signaling behavior of individuals.
Most people, especially economists, know that very many studies have shown that higher
education degrees and diplomas have a positive eect upon one's future wages. Moreover,
many noneconomists (e.g. students in higher education) also know that their education
investment not only creates labor skills, but also provides value in the form of a degree
or diploma. We can interpret this as meaning that students choose not only the amount
of human capital investment to be undertaken, but also the amount of investment in the
degree or diploma (hereafter referred to as signal investment), because they select education
institutions by taking into account the value of the degree or diploma for each higher education
provider.
In this paper, we introduce an overlapping generations economy, where parents are hetero-
geneous in their wages, being either rich or poor. Each set of parents invests in the two types
of education for their children, namely, human capital investment and signal investment. Sig-
nal investment in this model implies investment undertaken only for obtaining an observable
signal, which does not contribute to labor skills. Conversely, in our model, human capital
investment not only contributes to improving labor skills, but is also helpful for obtaining
signals. Moreover, there exists uncertainty in the acquisition of signals by students, which
is determined endogenously by the dierences in each type of education investment by the
rich and the poor. That is, because rich parents can invest more in each type of education,
students with rich parents nd it easier to obtain a high-ranking (or better-signaling) degree
or diploma as the education gap between rich and poor becomes larger, and vice versa for
poor students. This is a characteristic and plausible assumption, for example, because it is
easier to pass examinations as the lead in education levels over rivals becomes larger.
We obtain the following results. First, using static analysis, we nd that the ratio of
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human capital to signal investment for both the rich and the poor becomes a U-shaped
function of the wage dierential between the rich and the poor. In other words, the ratio
of human capital investment to signal investment is high when the wage dierential is very
small. As the rich{poor wage dierential increases moderately, the ratio of human capital
to signal investment decreases, whereas when the wage dierential exceeds a certain large
value, the ratio of human capital to signal investment again begins to increase. This result
illustrates a remarkable mechanism regarding higher education policy. For example, if the
ratio of human capital to signal investment is low at medium wage dierentials, government
education subsidies may not be eective for human capital accumulation. This is because
it does not provide households with any additional incentive for human capital investment,
even though households are currently investing less in human capital.1
Second, using dynamic analysis, we nd three patterns of stable steady states of wage dif-
ferentials exist in our economy: the unique steady state with no-inequality, the unique steady
state with high-inequality, and multiple steady states. Two parameters mainly distinguish
between these alternative steady states: the relative productivity of highly skilled workers,
and the degree of exibility in uncertainty. The increase in the relative productivity of highly
skilled workers leads to larger wage dierentials in the steady state. Accordingly, this result
well describes the expansion of wage dierentials between high school and college graduates
during the last three decades in many advanced countries as explained by skill-biased tech-
nical change. Many other theoretical models and empirical evidence have provided similar
results.2 Conversely, we show that if the degree of exibility in uncertainty is high, that is,
if the uncertainty of the signal can easily be mitigated through a widening of the education
gap, then wage dierentials may converge to the high-inequality steady state.
Moreover, by combining these static and dynamic results, we show that skill-biased tech-
nical change switches the economy from the no-inequality to the high-inequality steady state,
and the ratio of human capital to signal investment changes in a U-shaped form during the
transition to the high-inequality steady state. That is, signal investment ratio begins increas-
ing as soon as the steady state switches, and that after some periods, it will begin to decrease
with the expansion of the rich{poor wage dierential.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the background
of the model and discusses the related literature. Section 3 describes the construction of
1This implication is consistent with the theoretical results in Blankenau and Camera (2009) and the em-
pirical results in Hanushek and Woessmann (2007).
2See, for example, Autor, Katz and Krueger (1998), Acemoglu (1998), and Galor and Moav (2000).
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the model. Section 4 illustrates the mechanism underlying the U-shaped relation between
the human capital to signal investment ratio and wage dierentials. In this section, we also
provide some discussion of the policy implications of these results. In Section 5, we analyze the
three patterns of steady states for the wage dierentials and discuss the pattern of education
investment in these states. Section 6 concludes. The appendix includes some of the proofs.
2 Background and Previous Literature
A voluminous economic literature has explored the relationship between education and wage
income from both the theoretical and empirical perspectives. As to the basic theoretical
models explaining this relationship, these are human capital theory as per Becker (1964) and
signaling theory as per Spence (1973, 1974).
Many empirical studies, including those of Lang and Kropp (1986), Hungerford and Solon
(1987), Belman and Heywood (1991) and Bedard (2001), argue that higher education serves
as a signal of higher productivity in addition to increasing individual human capital, and
that this signal is rewarded in the labor market, and has since been labeled the educational
sorting hypothesis. Subsequent US studies, such as those of Jaeger and Page (1996) and
Park (1999), nd strong evidence of the size of these sheepskin eects, with wage gains in
the order of 9{10% associated with high school graduation, 11% with an associate degree,
and 20{30% associated with a bachelor's degree. In other work, Tyler et al. (2000) employ
General Educational Development (GED) test scores and nd that the GED signal increases
the earnings of young white dropouts by some 10{19%.
From these studies, it is obvious that students obtain a valuable signal as well as human
capital by receiving higher education. Further, if many higher education institutions exist,
and they dier from one another in the quality of education and the value of diploma, then
students and parents can determine the level of human capital and signal investment by
selecting which schools to enter. This is our concept of human capital investment and signal
investment.
As the theoretical contributions, Costrell (1994) and Betts (1998) describe education
investment that can be both human capital investment and signaling. The main features
of these models were that if students achieve educational standards they obtain a degree or
diploma, and therefore students invest in human capital as signaling. As an alternative, in
our paper, we examine human capital investment and signal investment separately.
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More recently, Blankenau and Camera (2006, 2009) construct a model where homoge-
neous students choose their education investment from among skilled (with diploma and
skill), schooled (diploma but no skill), and unschooled (no diploma and no skill). Their con-
cepts of skilled and schooled are very similar to our human capital and signal investment,
respectively. Blankenau and Camera (2009) conclude that when rms recognize the produc-
tivity of each student with a low probability, it acts against the incentive of students to earn
skills. Therefore, government education policy in the form of education subsidies may fail to
ensure the additional human capital accumulation of students.3 However, we obtain similar
policy implications in this paper using a somewhat dierent explanation. More particularly,
in our analysis, the U-shaped ratio of human capital to signal investment with respect to
the wage dierential provides a novel mechanism whereby the widening (or narrowing) of the
wage dierential changes the individual incentive for human capital investment.
Elsewhere, Lee (2007), Bergh and Fink (2009), and Futagami and Ishiguro (2004) explain
the dierence in educational investment as a form of signaling between countries. In particu-
lar, Lee (2007) shows that signaling may occur over time in both high school and college, and
that society may dier in the timing of this signaling. This possibly explains the dierence
in education investment by students in the US and East Asia. In contrast, in this paper,
dierences in wage dierentials explain dierences in signal investment.
3 The Model
Consider a discrete-time overlapping generations economy where each agent lives three pe-
riods: young, middle-aged and old. At t = 0, there exists one unit of rich agents and one
unit of poor agents in each generation (here, \rich young" are children born to rich parents).
Moreover, we assume there is no population growth.
In the rst period of life, the young receive education from their parents. We assume all
young are born with the same ability. However, the ex post educational attainment levels
dier across the young because of heterogeneity in parental income. At the end of the young
period, each young obtains signal H or L with uncertainty. In other words, highly educated
young born of rich parents do not always obtain signal H. As will be made clear in Section
3.3, the population size of both the young with signal H and the young with signal L have a
mass of one in all periods.
3This is consistent with the empirical results in Hanushek (1986, 2003).
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In the second period of life, the middle-aged work and obtain wage income. Assume that
rms can observe signals but cannot observe the individual productivity of each middle-aged
worker; then, middle-aged workers receive wages according to their signal. Consequently,
workers with signal H become rich and workers with signal L become poor when middle
aged. We assume each middle-aged worker gives birth to one child and allocates their income
between their own consumption and investment in education for their child. Put dierently,
saving and borrowing do not take place when middle aged, which we interpret as borrowing
constraints.
In the nal period of life, the old work and consume. Unlike the middle aged, the old
neither bear a child nor invest in education. Moreover, we assume that rms can observe the
individual productivity of old workers. This is a plausible assumption given that, in general,
it is easier to observe the productivity of old employees than new employees (middle-aged
workers) because they have worked longer in the rm. The rms then pay wages to each
old worker according to their individual productivity.4 Given that the productivity of old
workers depends on their education in their youth, one unit of rich and one unit of poor also
emerge in the old generation. Note that membership of the rich middle-aged generation in
period t is not consistent with membership of the rich old generation in period t+ 1.
3.1 Production
Firms produce nal goods using only labor inputs. The individual output of high-skilled
(highly educated) labor and low-skilled labor is assumed to vary according to the following
linear technologies, hH;t+1, hL;t+1, where hH;t+1 and hL;t+1 are the human capital of high-
and low-skilled middle-aged workers in period t + 1.  > 1 implies a type of technology
that only high-skilled workers can use. Because rms cannot observe the productivity of
each middle-aged worker, rms pay wages according to the individual signals. Given the
assumption of perfect competition, the wage of middle-aged workers with signal i needs to be
consistent with the expectations of rms about the average productivity of all middle-aged
workers with signal i. Then, in period t + 1, the wage of each middle-aged worker (born in
period t) is:
4The abovementioned borrowing constraints play a role in preventing the expansion of income types. In
the absence of this assumption, the number of income types in period t + 1 doubles from period t because
education investment decisions by the middle aged are aected by their future old incomes.
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w^H;t+1 = ^t+1h^H;t+1 + (1  ^t+1)h^L;t+1; (1)
w^L;t+1 = ^t+1h^L;t+1 + (1  ^t+1)h^H;t+1; (2)
where w^H;t+1 and w^L;t+1 are the wage of middle-aged workers with signal H and with signal
L, respectively. t+1 represents the proportion of high-skilled workers within the signal H
group and the proportion of low-skilled workers within the signal L group. That is, as we
will discuss in Section 3.3, t+1 represents the uncertainty of the signal. Moreover, h^H;t+1,
h^L;t+1 and ^t+1 represent the rms' expectations of hH;t+1, hL;t+1 and t+1. Given t+1 is
endogenously determined according to the unobservable education levels of the young, wages
will be paid according to these expectations. 5
5We can interpret this production setting as the circumstance where regardless of signal and productivity,
all workers work in the same workplace where only high-skilled labor can use the technology. The rms'
owners, however, cannot observe which middle-aged workers are using this technology, so they pay wages
according to the workers' signals.
We can alter this setting as follows. Assume there is a sector H with technology and a sector L with no
technology. The rm owners then allocate middle-aged workers into the sector H or the sector L according
to their signals. High- and low-skilled workers in the sector H can produce hH;t+1 and hL;t+1, respectively,
while low-skilled workers in the sector L produce hL;t+1. Importantly, the high-skilled workers in the sector
L produce only hH;t+1 because there is no technology in that sector. The respective wages of middle-aged
workers with signal H and signal L are then:
w^H;t+1 = ^t+1h^H;t+1 + (1  ^t+1)h^L;t+1;
w^L;t+1 = ^t+1h^L;t+1 + (1  ^t+1)h^H;t+1:
This modication slightly changes the steady states of the wage dierentials in Section 5. However, all of the
results shown in Section 5 remain unchanged: that is, we continue to obtain three patterns of stable steady
states.
Furthermore, using a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function, (hH + (1   )hL)1=
where  > 1=2 leads to the same result as in the above setting. In this case, the wages of each middle-aged
worker and the wage dierentials are:
w^H;t+1 = ^t+1h^

H;t+1(h

H + (1  )hL)
1

 1
+ (1  ^t+1)(1  )h^L;t+1(hH + (1  )hL)
1

 1
;
w^L;t+1 = ^t+1(1  )h^L;t+1(hH + (1  )hL)
1

 1
+ (1  ^t+1)h^H;t+1(hH + (1  )hL)
1

 1
:
w^H;t+1
w^L;t+1
=
^t+1

1  h^

H;t+1 + (1  ^t+1)h^L;t+1
^t+1h^

L;t+1 + (1  ^t+1) 1  h^H;t+1
:
=(1 ) can be interpreted as the same as , and parameter  represents the elasticity of substitution. In this
case, we can obtain the same results as in the earlier setting where  > 0, but the CES production complicates
the interpretation. Therefore, for simplicity, we employ a linear technology for the production function as
discussed above.
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The wages of old workers are paid according to their productivities because rms can
observe these levels. Then, in period t + 1, the wages of high- and low-skilled old workers
(born in period t  1) are hH;t and hL;t, respectively. That is, the wages of old workers are
paid regardless of their signal, so the uncertainty has no relevance for the old wage.
3.2 Education investments
Parents invest in two types of education for their children, one that is productive and another
that is not. Here, we refer to the former as human capital investment, and the latter as signal
investment.
The human capital of the middle-aged generation born in period t is given by:
hi;t+1 = B(ei;t)
(ht)
1 ; (3)
where ei;t is the human capital investment made by the parents, ht is the average human
capital of the parents' generation, and  2 (0; 1). In this model, given that the human capital
investment of the rich is higher than that of the poor in equilibrium, then the subscript i = H,
L of ei;t indicates both the income and investment levels of the parents.
Signal investment is as follows:
Si;t+1 = B
0(si;t)(ht)1  ; (4)
where si;t is the signal investment made by the parents, and  2 (0; 1). Using the same
reasoning as earlier, we use the subscript i = H, L of si;t to represent both income and
investment levels. Note that Si;t+1 is not the signal, but rather only the ability to obtain a
high signal. Therefore, signal investment si;t here can be interpreted as an investment only
for obtaining a signal, such as school expenses for an ospring who never makes any eort to
study before examinations.
Here we assume that rms cannot observe the ability to obtain signal Si;t+1, signal invest-
ment level si;t+1, human capital hi;t+1 and human capital investment level ei;t of middle-aged
workers.
3.3 Uncertainty of the signal
In this subsection, we give the denition of the probability t+1 that describes the uncertainty
of the signal. The denition is, \the probability of obtaining a signal, the type of which is
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the same as one's education level". In other words, young with high education, hH;t+1 and
SH;t+1, get signal H with probability t+1, but they get signal L with probability 1   t+1.
Likewise, young with low education, hL;t+1 and SL;t+1, get signal L with probability t+1, but
they get signal H with probability 1   t+1. Then, we express the uncertainty of the signal
for both types of young in the same function as follows:
t+1 = (eht+1; eSt+1); (5)
where eht+1 = hH;t+1=hL;t+1 and eSt+1 = SH;t+1=SL;t+1. We assume that  2 [12 ; 1), eh > 0,
eheh < 0, eS > 0, eS eS < 0, eheS < 0, (1; 1) = 12 , and limeh!1;eS!1 = 1.6
This probability can be explained as an increasing function of the educational gap between
rich and poor young, eht+1 and eSt+1. In other words, as the gap in the education level between
rich and poor increases, the rich young can obtain signal H more easily, whereas the poor
young nd it more dicult to obtain signal H.
The most important assumptions for  are eh > 0 and eS > 0. We can well recognize
these properties as the negative relationship between income inequality and intergenerational
social mobility. For instance, Andrews and Leigh (2009) show that sons who grew up in coun-
tries that were more unequal in the 1970s were less likely to have experienced social mobility
by the late 1990s. Theoretical studies also support this relationship from the perspective of
both human capital and signaling.7 In this model, the educational gaps of the young, eht+1
and eSt+1, are positively correlated with the parents' wage dierentials. Moreover, we can
interpret an increase in  as a decrease in intergenerational social mobility. Although we do
not pay any particular attention to the issue of social mobility in this analysis, it has support
in our assumptions regarding .
When parents determine education investment, ei;t and si;t, they need to take the strategy
of other parents as given. As all rich parents and all poor parents are homogeneous in any
given period, we can regard each parent income type as two representative agents. Therefore,
in our optimization problem, we assume that a representative rich parent and a representative
poor parent respectively determine education investment, given the strategy of the other.
6These assumptions are satised by using simple exponential functions, such as:
(eht+1; eSt+1) = 1  1
2
exp
 
C(1  eht+1 eSt+1);
where C represents the curvature of . We use this function in later sections.
7See Solon (2004) for the human capital approach and Ferrer (2004) for the signaling approach.
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3.4 Household
The preferences of each individual are dened over consumption and the expected wage of
their ospring. The lifetime utilities of the middle aged with signal H (rich parents) and the
middle aged with signal L (poor parents) in period t are dened by the following function:
UH =  ln cH;t + (1  )
h
(eht+1; eSt+1) ln w^H;t+1 +  1 (eht+1; eSt+1) ln w^L;t+1i
+ 
h
 ln ck;t+1 + (1  ) lnhH;t+1
i
; (6)
UL =  ln cL;t + (1  )
h
(eht+1; eSt+1) ln w^L;t+1 +  1 (eht+1; eSt+1) ln w^H;t+1i
+ 
h
 ln ck;t+1 + (1  ) lnhL;t+1
i
; (7)
where ci;t is own consumption in middle age, the brackets on the rst line express the ex-
pected middle-aged wage of their ospring,  2 (0; 1) is the time discount rate, ck;t+1 is
own consumption in old age, and lnhH;t+1 and lnhL;t+1 represent the old wages of their
ospring. Note that the subscript for old consumption k = H or L diers from that of signal
i = H or L because the type of signal is not always consistent with their human capital, so
the middle-aged consumption types cH;t and cL;t are not always consistent with the old-aged
consumption types cH;t+1 and cL;t+1.
Finally, the budget constraint for the middle aged is expressed as follows:
cH;t + eH;t + sH;t = wH;t; (8)
cL;t + eL;t + sL;t = wL;t: (9)
The budget constraint for the old is simply that old consumption equals the old wage.
3.5 Optimization and equilibrium
As mentioned above, each middle-aged agent in period t chooses ci;t, ei;t and si;t within the
budget wi;t. Given that the optimal allocations in old age are simply cH;t+1 = hH;t and
cL;t+1 = hL;t, we exclude these terms in (6) and (7) from the optimization. Then, the utility
maximization problem of the middle aged in period t is described as follows:
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8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
max
ci;t;ei;t;si;t
Ui
s:t: ci;t + ei;t + si;t = wi;t
given wi;t; w^i;t+1; w^j;t+1; ej;t; and sj;t
:
Note that as the ospring's future wages w^i;t+1 and w^j;t+1 depend only on the rm's expec-
tations ^t+1, h^i;t+1, and h^j;t+1, parents take w^i;t+1 and w^j;t+1 as given in the optimization
problems. After some simple deformation, the FOC of the rich middle-aged optimization
problem with respect to eH;t and sH;t is rewritten as follows:
eH;t :
eH;t
wH;t   eH;t   sH;t =
(1  )


 +
@(eht+1; eSt+1)
@eht+1 eht+1 ln w^H;t+1w^L;t+1

; (10)
sH;t :
sH;t
wH;t   eH;t   sH;t =
(1  )

@(eht+1; eSt+1)
@ eSt+1 eSt+1 ln w^H;t+1w^L;t+1 : (11)
The FOC of the poor middle-aged optimization problem with respect to eL;t and sL;t can be
rewritten in the same manner:
eL;t :
eL;t
wL;t   eL;t   sL;t =
(1  )


 +
@(eht+1; eSt+1)
@eht+1 eht+1 ln w^H;t+1w^L;t+1

; (12)
sL;t :
sL;t
wL;t   eL;t   sL;t =
(1  )

@(eht+1; eSt+1)
@ eSt+1 eSt+1 ln w^H;t+1w^L;t+1 : (13)
In equilibrium, eht+1, eSt+1, and t+1 must be determined uniquely. Moreover, in equi-
librium, the actual education levels of rich and poor children must coincide with the rms'
expectations: hi;t+1 = h^i;t+1, Si;t+1 = S^i;t+1 and (eht+1; eSt+1) = ^t+1. Then, in equilibrium,
from (1) and (2), rms' expectations w^H;t+1 and w^L;t+1 satisfy:
w^H;t+1 = (eht+1; eSt+1)hH;t+1 +  1 (eht+1; eSt+1)hL;t+1;
w^L;t+1 = (eht+1; eSt+1)hL;t+1 +  1 (eht+1; eSt+1)hH;t+1:
Now the right-hand sides of (10) and (12), (11) and (13) are given by the same formula.
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Then we have that the left-hand side of (10) equals that of (12) and the left-hand side of (11)
equals that of (13), and from these two equations we obtain:
eH;t
eL;t
=
sH;t
sL;t
=
wH;t
wL;t
 ewt; (14)
where ewt  wH;t=wL;t are the middle-aged wage dierentials between the rich and the poor.
Equation (14) indicates that human capital and signal investment of the rich are always
greater than that of the poor. In addition, this equation also implies that the rich and the
poor always choose the same education investment ratio irrespective of the wage dierentialewt, that is:
eH;t
sH;t
=
eL;t
sL;t
: (15)
By substituting (14) into eht+1 and eSt+1, we have:
eht+1 = B(eH;t)(ht)1 
B(eL;t)(ht)1 
=

eH;t
eL;t

=
  ewt;
eSt+1 = B0(sH;t)(ht)1 
B0(sL;t)(ht)1 
=

sH;t
sL;t

=
  ewt :
Then, t+1 is expressed as a function of ewt, namely t+1 = ( ewt), which satises 0( ewt) > 0,
00( ewt) < 0, (1) = 1=2 , and lim ewt!1( ewt) = 1. Now we have eht+1, eSt+1 and  as a
function of ewt, so we can represent the wage dierentials of the next generation ewt+1 as a
function of ewt as follows:
ewt+1 = w^H;t+1
w^L;t+1
=
( ewt)  ewt +  1 ( ewt)
( ewt) +  1 ( ewt)  ewt : (16)
Thus, we can express the right-hand sides of (10)s(13) as a function of ewt. Given that
the middle aged take ewt as a given in the optimization problems, the right-hand sides of
(10)s(13) are constant in equilibrium. Hence, we can derive the equilibrium value of each
education investment eH;t, sH;t, eL;t and sL;t if we specify the function of . However, given
it is not necessary for subsequent analysis, we omit this work.
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4 Ratio of Human Capital to Signal Education Investment
This section proposes a static analysis that examines how the ratio of human capital to signal
education investment is a function of ewt 2 [1;1). As shown in equation (15), rich and poor
parents divide education investment into human capital and signal investment at the same
ratio. Then, from (10)s(13) we obtain that:
et
st
=


@(eht+1;eSt+1)
@eht+1 eht+1 ln ewt+1 + 
@(eht+1;eSt+1)
@ eSt+1 eSt+1 ln ewt+1
=


"
"h
"s
+

@(eht+1;eSt+1)
@ eSt+1 eSt+1 ln ewt+1
#
; (17)
where
"h =
@(eht+1;eSt+1)
@eht+1
.
(eht+1;eSt+1)eht+1 and "s = @(eht+1;eSt+1)@ eSt+1
.
(eht+1;eSt+1)eSt+1 .
Let us assume for simplicity that the ratio of the elasticity of substitution "h="s is constant
(but "h and "s respectively do not have to be constant).
8 Given this assumption, we need
examine only the denominator of the second term in (17).
@(eht+1; eSt+1)=@ eSt+1 decreases and converges to zero with an increase in ewt, whereaseSt+1 ln ewt+1 increases and diverges to innity with an increase in ewt. However, we have
@(eht+1; eSt+1)=@ eSt+1 eSt+1 ln ewt+1 = 0 when ewt = 1 from ln ewt+1 = 0. Then, as the next step,
we wish to know the value of @(eht+1; eSt+1)=@ eSt+1 eSt+1 ln ewt+1 when ewt !1.
Lemma 1. @(
eht+1;eSt+1)
@ eSt+1 eSt+1 ln ewt+1 ! 0 when ewt !1 (see Appendix for details).
From this lemma, we nd that @(eht+1; eSt+1)=@ eSt+1 eSt+1 ln ewt+1 is an inverse U-shaped
function of ewt, because it is equal to zero at ewt = 1 and ewt !1 but it takes some positive
value for ewt 2 (1;1). Strictly speaking, it is not always single peaked. In fact, whether
this term is single peaked or not depends on the functional form of  or the values of the
parameters. However, we can refer to its entire form as \inverse U-shaped" as it is equal to
8This property is easily satised if we specify the form of  as an exponential function. Of course, the
simple exponential function we illustrated in footnote 6 satises this property. Here,  must fulll  ! 1
when eht+1; eSt+1 ! 1; then it is dicult to use a function other than an exponential. For this reason, we
remove the eect of "h="s for simplicity.
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zero when ewt = 1 and converges to zero when ewt ! 1, so we identify it as being \inverse
U-shaped".
Proposition 1. et=st is a U-shaped function of ewt.
Figure 1 depicts equation (17) in the ratio of human capital to signal investment et=st and
the wage dierential of the middle-aged generation ewt space.
Figure 1
Notes : Figure 1 draws equation (17) using (eht+1; eSt+1) = 1   12 exp  C(1   eht+1 eSt+1), C = 0:6,  = 0:8,
 = 0:9,  = 1:5 and  = 0:2. Of course, this functional form for  satises the following assumptions thus
far:  2 [ 1
2
; 1), eh > 0, eheh < 0, eS > 0, eS eS < 0, eheS < 0, (1; 1) = 12 , limeh!1;eS!1 = 1, and "h="s
is constant. In this case, the denominator of the second term in (17) is single peaked.
This result is intuitive. If ewt is suciently small, each parent perceives that the wage
dierential in their ospring's generation will also be small. In this case, the uncertainty of the
signal is an insignicant problem, so parents give weight to human capital investment for their
ospring's old wages. Moreover, when ewt is suciently large, even though the uncertainty of
signal is in turn a signicant problem, parents also give weight to human capital investment.
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This is because the dierence in expenditure invested in education between the rich and the
poor is large, so the uncertainty of the signal can be reduced only by the human capital
investment gap eht+1. Finally, in the remaining case, when a middling ewt is realized, both
rich and poor parents largely invest in signal investment. In this case, the wage dierentials
of the parents are not large enough to eliminate uncertainty, and full investment in human
capital is insucient for obtaining signal H; thus, both sets of parents (rich and poor) have
an incentive to invest largely in signal investment.
Based on this proposition, we can provide a warning for public education policies. Under
a certain level of wage dierentials where incentive for households for signal investment is
large, human capital accumulation may be insensitive to public subsidies for higher education.
In other words, at this wage dierential level, households choose which schools to enter with
an emphasis on obtaining a high signal, so that a simple education policy, such as a tuition
subsidy, could be a waste of public funds. Moreover, the income redistribution eect of public
education expenditures will also lower the household human capital investment ratio. In
very high inequality countries, for example, an exponential increase in government education
expenditure narrows the educational gap and may decrease the household human capital
to signal investment ratio e=s. Thus, a simple quantitative increase in higher education
subsidies may not be eective in improving human capital accumulation at suciently large
wage dierentials.
5 The Dynamics of Wage Dierentials
In this section we investigate the steady state of the dynamic system of middle-aged wage
dierentials ewt. In our analysis, the wage dierentials of the middle-aged generation are
essential because parents in the middle-aged generation invest in education and determine
the next generation's wage dierentials.9 To derive the steady states for ewt+1, let us examine
a large/small relation between ewt+1 and ewt. Using equation (16), the relation ewt+1 > ewt can
be rewritten as follows:
1
( ewt) < ewt   
  ewt
1    ewt+1 + 1  X( ewt): (18)
9In contrast, the wage dierential of the old generation in steady state eh is always larger than that of the
middle generation ew.
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Now we can nd the large/small relation between ewt+1 and ewt by examining the large/small
relation between X( ewt) and 1=( ewt). From the assumption of , we have 1=( ewt) is a con-
vex and decreasing function of ewt; it equals two when ewt = 1, and converges to one as ewt
goes to innity. Next, we have to examine the shape of X( ewt). Note that since ewt is dened
on [1;1], 1=( ewt) is always greater than one. Therefore, when we conne the analysis of the
shape of X( ewt) to the region X( ewt) > 1, the following lemma can be obtained.
Lemma 2. X 0( ewt) < 0 and X 00( ewt) > 0 where X( ewt) > 1. Moreover, X(1) = 2 (see
Appendix for details).
From Lemma 2, we nd that the shape of X( ewt) is quite similar to that of 1=( ewt). X( ewt)
is a convex and decreasing function of ewt, and equals two when ewt = 1. What is dierent
from 1=( ewt) is that X( ewt) falls below one at a certain nite value of ewt, and then it is
always less than one for any larger ewt, because it always decreases in the region greater than
one. Hence, our task here is simply comparing two convex and decreasing curves according
to the change in the parameters.
Note that when ewt = 1, 1= = X = 2 holds. From equation (18), we obtain @X=@ > 0,
@X=@ > 0 and @X=@ = 0, that is, increases in  and  shift up X( ewt) for all ewt 2 (1;1).
On the other hand, we have @=@ = 0, @=@ > 0 and @=@ > 0 from the assumption
eh > 0 and eS > 0. Then we have that increases in  and  shift down 1=( ewt) for allewt 2 (1;1). However, as we have not specied the functional form of ( ewt), the graph of
1=( ewt) can be drawn freely as long as it satises the conditions set so far, and there may
exist many interactions between 1=( ewt) and X( ewt). To simplify the analysis, let us conne
the cases to where these two curves intersect at most three times. Then the following three
cases are possible:
?i?No-inequality steady state at ew = 1, denoted by ew1.
?ii?Multiple steady states at ew = 0 and ew > 1.
?iii?High-inequality steady state at ew > 1, denoted by ew2.
Figure 2 draws?i???iii?. From the left-hand side of this gure, we can see that there
is no other pattern of steady states as long as the two curves intersect at most three times,
and that the cases where the two curves intersect more than four times are extremely rare.
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Of course, ranges of ewt that satisfy X( ewt) > 1=( ewt) in the left-hand side are consistent
with ranges of ewt that satisfy ewt+1 > ewt on the right-hand side. Then we can see thatew1 will occur under lower ,  and , whereas ew2 will occur under higher ,  and .
Moreover, an increases in C shifts up 1=( ewt) if we specify the functional form of  as
(eht+1; eSt+1) = 1   12 exp(C(1   eht+1 eSt+1)). As C here represents the curvature of , a
high C means that 1=( ewt) is sharply shaped as the case?iii?in gures. Therefore, more
generally, we can see that ew2 will occur under a sharply shaped ; then we have the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. The steady state wage dierentials ew satisfy:
?i?No-inequality steady state ew1 will be realized for lower ,  and , and for the
shallow slope of .
?ii?For some middle values of , ,  and the curvature of , multiple steady statesew = 1 and ew > 1 may exist.
?iii?High-inequality steady state ew2 will be realized for higher ,  and , and for
sharply shaped .
Here,  and the curvature of  provide an important interpretation. At rst,  (> 1)
represents the technology only highly skilled workers can use. Therefore, we can see that as
technical innovation switches the steady state to the high-inequality steady state, then wage
dierentials increase during the transition to the steady state. This mechanism explains the
expansion of the wage dierentials between high school and college graduates during the last
three decades in many advanced countries, generally explained by skill-biased technological
change. On the other hand, the curvature of  implies how much the uncertainty of the signal
decreases as educational gaps, eht+1 and eSt+1, widen. We can interpret this as dierences in the
system or level of higher education between countries. When institutions of higher education
serve as strong signaling devices, we can apply a sharply shaped  that easily reduces the
uncertainty of the signal, and with this we can predict the widening wage dierentials.
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?i? No-inequality steady state ew1
The steady state for (eht+1; eSt+1) = 1  12 exp  C(1  eht+1 eSt+1), C = 0:3,  = 1:3,  = 0:7, and  = 0:9.
?ii? Multiple steady states
Steady states for (eht+1; eSt+1) = 1  12 exp  C(1  eht+1 eSt+1), C = 0:6,  = 1:5,  = 0:8, and  = 0:9.
?iii? High-inequality steady state ew2
The steady state for (eht+1; eSt+1) = 1  12 exp  C(1  eht+1 eSt+1), C = 3,  = 1:6,  = 0:8, and  = 0:9.
Figure 2
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U-shaped function e=s and high-inequality steady state ew2 for (eht+1; eSt+1) = 1  12 exp  C(1  eht+1 eSt+1),
C = 1:6,  = 1:6,  = 0:6,  = 0:9 and  = 0:2. In this case, the education investment ratio e=s changes in a
U-shaped form during the transition to ew2 .
Figure 3
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More important is the relation between the U-shape of the investment ratio and the switch
in the steady states. When an increase in  switches the steady state from ew1 to ew2, the
ratio of human capital to signal investment changes during the transition to the steady state.
Note that parents invest only in human capital at ew = 1; hence, signal investment increases
for at least a couple of periods from the moment the steady state switches to ew2. Moreover,
if the new steady state ew2 is larger than the value of ew, which minimizes the U-shaped
function (17), the ratio of human capital to signal investment begins to increase after some
periods. Then, in this case, we obtain that the transition of the investment ratio changes in
a U-shaped form with time, as in Figure 3.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the economy is initially at the no-inequality steady state ew1
and then switches to the high-inequality steady state ew2. From this point, e=s decreases for
at least a couple of periods and then may begin to increase during the transition to ew2.
If we suppose that a large increase of  switches the steady state, we can infer from
this proposition that people increased signal investment under the inuence of skill-biased
technical change. Hence, the popularization of higher education realized in many advanced
countries in parallel with technical change may contain a high proportion of signal invest-
ment. Furthermore, as this increase in households' incentives for signal investment weakens
human capital accumulation in higher education, then a simple public subsidy policy for
higher education, such as tuition subsidies, may not actually be benecial for human capital
accumulation, as shown in Hanushek (2003).
6 Conclusions and Remarks
In this paper, we explored the relation between wage dierentials and education investment.
The static analysis suggested that the ratio of human capital investment to signal investment
becomes a U-shaped function of the wage dierentials. This result yields a new explanation for
the incentive of households (or students) for learning under uncertainty in the identication of
skills. In particular, with a medium degree of inequality, households have a greater incentive
to invest in education as signaling, which does not contribute to human capital acquisition. In
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this case, higher education will contribute little to the gross accumulation of human capital.
In the dynamic analysis, we showed that three patterns of stable steady states of wage
dierentials exist, namely, the no-inequality steady state, the high-inequality steady state,
and multiple steady states. We analyzed these dierences while mainly paying attention to
the level of technology that only skilled workers can use. A rapid increase in the technology
level for skilled workers, that is, skill-biased technical change, switches the steady state to the
high-inequality steady state, and then the wage dierential starts increasing toward a new
steady state. Moreover, by combining the static and dynamic results, we obtain the dynamics
of the ratio of human capital to signal investment during the transition to the new steady
state. From the time the steady state switches, signal investment ratio increases for at least
some periods, but afterwards may begin to decrease. Therefore, we can forecast large signal
investments for some periods at the same time as the wage dierential is expanding if the
economy was at the low-inequality or no-inequality steady state before the technical change.
The above results provide some policy implications. First, in a country with a medium
degree of inequality, simple subsidies for higher education that fail to create an additional
incentive for human capital investment may also fail to encourage the accumulation of student
human capital because households may make use of these subsidies in signal investment. On
the other hand, given that the poor typically receive education subsidies, the gap-narrowing
eect of educational subsidies will also have an impact on the ratio of human capital to
signal education investment by households. In a country with a high degree of inequality, for
example, since a considerable expansion of education subsidies has a large eect on narrowing
the educational gap, its policy eect on the accumulation of student human capital may
be weakened by the increase in signal investment by households. In short, it is desirable
that education subsidies provide an incentive for human capital investment, as discussed in
Hanushek (2003). However, we should note that it is the size of the wage dierentials between
rich and poor, or between college and high school graduates, that we should pay attention to
in order to induce households to invest in human capital via education policies.
21
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
To simplify the exposition, we use t+1 instead of (eht+1; eSt+1). Since we have ln ewt+1 <
lneht+1 <  lneht+1 when ewt ! 1, the denominator of the second term in (17) can be
rewritten as follows:
@t+1
@ eSt+1 eSt+1 ln ewt+1 < @t+1@ eSt+1 eSt+1 lneht+1:
Also, we have eht+1 =  eSt+1 , then from the right-hand side of the above equation, we have:

@t+1
@ eSt+1 eSt+1 lneht+1 =  @t+1@ ln   ln eSt+1 ! 0 (when ewt !1):
The last term of limit to zero is obtained by properties that  ! 1 when ewt ! 1, while
ln(ln eSt+1)!1 when ewt !1. Then, we obtain:
limewt!1
@(eht+1; eSt+1)
@ eSt+1 eSt+1 ln ewt+1 = 0:

Proof of Lemma 2
First, we check the sign of the rst-order derivative:
dXt
d ewt = 1(1  ( ewt)+1)2
h
1  ( ewt) 1   2( ewt)2 + ( ewt)+1i
=
1
(1  ( ewt)+1)2
h
1  ( ewt) 1   (1  )2( ewt)2   2( ewt)2 + ( ewt)+1i:
The third and fourth terms in the second line resolve the third term in the rst line. Note
that we now conne the analysis to the region Xt > 1, so that our analytical range of ewt
becomes 1 < ( ewt)1  < . Then we have
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1  ( ewt) 1   (1  )2( ewt)2 < 1    (1  ) = 0;
 2( ewt)2 + ( ewt)+1 = ( ewt)+1 1  ( ewt) 1 < 0:
Therefore, for all ranges that satisfy Xt > 1, we have dXt=d ewt < 0. Next we check the sign
of the second-order derivative:
d2Xt
d ew2t = 1(1  ( ewt)+1)3
h
(2 +3+2)( ewt)   (2 +5)2( ewt)2 1 + (+1)2( ewt)2+1
+ (1  )( ewt) 2   23( ewt)3i
=
1
(1  ( ewt)+1)3
h
(2 + 5)( ewt) + 2(1  )( ewt)
  (2 + 5)2( ewt)2 1 + (+ 1)2( ewt)2+1 + (1  )( ewt) 2
  2(1  )3( ewt)3   (+ 1)3( ewt)3   (1  )3( ewt)3i:
In the same manner as described above:
(2 + 5)( ewt)   (2 + 5)2( ewt)2 1 = (2 + 5)( ewt) 1  ( ewt) 1 < 0
2(1  )( ewt)   2(1  )3( ewt)3 = 2(1  )( ewt) 1  ( ewt) 1 < 0
(+ 1)2( ewt)2+1   (+ 1)3( ewt)3 = (+ 1)2( ewt)2+1 1  ( ewt) 1 < 0
(1  )( ewt) 2   (1  )3( ewt)3 = (1  )( ewt) 2 1  ( ewt)+1 1 + ( ewt)+1 < 0:
Therefore, for all ranges that satisfy Xt > 1, we have d
2Xt=d ew2t > 0.

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